Tag: India

U.S. Diplomatic Dilemma: Navigating the Canada-India Tensions Over Sikh Leader’s Killing

On Monday, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau made a startling announcement before the Canadian Parliament: Canadian intelligence services collected “credible intelligence” indicating that Indian agents were involved in the assassination of Hardeep Singh Nijjar, a Sikh separatist leader in British Columbia in June. In a strong statement from the usually mild-mannered prime minister, Mr. Trudeau noted that “any involvement of a foreign government in the killing of a Canadian citizen on Canadian soil is an unacceptable violation of our sovereignty.” In a tit-for-that reaction, Canada expelled the head of India’s intelligence agency in Canada, leading India to kick out a senior Canadian diplomat the next day. Mr. Trudeau’s accusation pushed already chilly relations to a new low, and put the United States in the precarious position of trying to maintain ties with two major allies at loggerheads.  

The history of Sikh separatism dates back to India’s independence from British occupation in 1947. As British colonial rule came to an end, religious divisions prompted the creation of two countries: one for the Muslim population – which became Pakistan – and India for the Hindu population. At this time, however, the Sikhs – who are still in the majority in the Indian state of Punjab – wanted to establish a separate state for Sikhs called Khalistan. This, however, did not happen, but the aspiration to create Khalistan lingered for decades among the Sikh insurgencies. This culminated in a period of violence in the 1980s, as Sikh separatists grew bolder. At that time, however, the violence became so bad that many Sikhs began to migrate from India, settling in countries like the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and, of course, Canada. Canada now has the largest Sikh population outside of India.  

The current diplomatic row demonstrates how ties between Canada and India have hit a low point and, as the Economist points out, Sikh separatism “has long been a sore point between India and Canada.” Almost immediately, New Delhi denied Mr. Trudeau’s accusations, calling them “absurd” and “politically motivated.” Ottawa’s accusation may not be a far cry from reality, though. While it may be nearly impossible to prove India was behind the assassination, masked gunman gunned down Mr. Nijjar, a prominent member of the Sikh community in British Columbia, in June. In 2020, Indian security agencies designated Mr. Nijjar as a terrorist as the Indian government accused him of supporting Sikh attacks in the Punjab state of India. And, as there is a large Sikh diaspora in Canada, India has long accused Canada of harboring “Khalistani terrorists and separatists.”

The row between one of its closest allies and an increasingly important partner certain puts the United States in an awkward spot. Canada is a NATO ally, a member of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing alliance, a member of the Group of 7, and America’s friendly neighbor to the North. As a result, one would expect that the United States and other Western allies’ responses to Canada’s claim to be supportive. In fact, Mr. Trudeau has asked its closest allies to publicly condemn the killing, and he even raised  the issue with senior officials from the Five Eyes alliance in the weeks before the Group of 20 summit in New Delhi. Yet, the response from Canada’s closest allies has been muted.

In particular, Mr. Trudeau raised the allegations to U.S. President Joe Biden and British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, in hopes that two of Canada’s closest allies would show support. The White House National Security Council (NSC) noted that Washington was “deeply concerned” about the allegations, but offered little else in the way of backing up its ally. Instead, the NSC spokesperson simply noted that it was critical that “Canada’s investigation proceed and the perpetrators be brought to justice.” The United Kingdom followed suit. The British Foreign Secretary posted on X that the United Kingdom had been “in regular contact” with its Canadian counterparts about the allegations. “Important that Canada’s investigation runs its course and the perpetrators brought to justice.” Mr. Sunak’s spokesman was cautious in his response as well, noting that the British Prime Minister would not comment on an ongoing investigation. Again, a pretty lackluster response from a key ally.

So, why is India so important? The United States and its Western allies – including the United Kingdom, France, Germany – are working to court India as a counterweight to China as the West turns its foreign policy focus toward the Indo-Pacific. Even Canada has tried to deepen its ties with India, identifying India as a critical partner in Canda’s Indo-Pacific strategy released in 2022. However, it does not seem that Mr. Trudeau’s announcement is enough to halt Western powers from pursuing better ties with India. In an attempt to improve relations with India, Mr. Biden and other Western allies have ignored human rights concerns among minority groups in India and Mr. Modi’s proclivity for Hindu nationalism at the expense of the rest of India’s population.

This diplomatic imbroglio represents the complexities of geopolitics. As the rift between Canada and India widens, President Biden’s diplomacy will be tested. Both India’s aspiration to be a global force and the U.S.’s strategy to counterbalance China in the global arena are at stake. However, perhaps the loser in all of this will be America’s key ally, Canada.

Is Expanding AUKUS the Solution?

In September 2021, the United States and the United Kingdom announced a plan to share submarine technology with Australia in a security pact awkwardly dubbed AUKUS. This was a particularly big deal at the time since the United States shares this technology with only one other ally, the United Kingdom. However, there is some debate over AUKUS’s utility.

In early December, Michael O’Hanlon, the Director of Research in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, drafted an op-ed asking a foundational question about the trilateral security pact: is AUKUS floundering? AUKUS, he notes, has become a central piece of the Biden administration’s grand strategy of shoring up alliances in the Asia-Pacific region – alongside building up the Quad and working to improve the testy relations between two key U.S. allies, Japan and South Korea. However, AUKUS appears to be in trouble, as he anticipates that  the alliance could “wither on the vine.” If AUKUS is, in fact, withering, expansion could help strengthen the pact. If this is the case, is expansion a viable option and which countries would be next in line to join?

Hurt Feelings

The AUKUS announcement infuriated a key U.S. ally: France. Not only were the French kept in the dark about the impending alliance, but it lost out on a lucrative submarine deal with Australia when Australia backed out of a contract with France to provide diesel-powered submarines in favor of the nuclear submarines promised by their American and British counterparts. In France’s mind, the announcement was a betrayal and resulted in France withdrawing its ambassadors from Washington and Canberra.  

However, there has been some speculation that France might be a potential candidate to join the non-nuclear portion of the alliance. In some ways, this makes a lot of sense. France seeks to position itself as a power in the Indo-Pacific, and already has a significant presence in the region. France is also the driving force behind the European Union’s strategic shift to the Indo-Pacific region. If the AUKUS partners were open to including France in the alliance – even the non-nuclear portion – it might go a long way in making up the monetary loss and diplomatic affront France endured at the initial announcement.

Left Out in the Cold

Two countries were overtly and, upon initial review, confusingly left out of the deal. Canada and New Zealand, members of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing alliance alongside the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia, were not included. The leaders of both countries were visibly annoyed, at first, but quickly played down any speculation of a slight. After the initial news wore off, it became evident why neither country were founding members of AUKUS.

Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau initially explained why the country was not included in the first place: Canada has not expressed any interest in building or operating nuclear-powered submarines. Similarly, New Zealand’s left-leaning Prime Minister, Jacinda Arden, reacted in a frustrated manner, stating that any nuclear-powered Australian submarines would not be allowed to dock in New Zealand waters. That frustration faded quickly, as New Zealand’s own policies against nuclear technology would make it difficult for inclusion in the program. It is unlikely that Canada or New Zealand, seemingly two obvious choices for potential inclusion, will join AUKUS at any point.

An Alliance Focused on the Asia-Pacific Region

One such reason for AUKUS’ purported trouble is that it encompasses only one country in the Asia-Pacific. For this reason, Japan has received the most attention in this regard. As Michael Auslin, a fellow at the Hoover Institution, points out, adding Japan to AUKUS could “transform security cooperation among liberal democracies in the Indo-Pacific like no other previous alliance or quasi-alliance has managed.” Japan’s security interests are already closely aligned with those of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, particularly in light of concerns over China, North Korea, and Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Japan, a key U.S. ally in Asia for nearly 70 years, immediately joined U.S. and European efforts to sanction Russia after its invasion of Ukraine. Additionally, Japan attended the NATO summit in Madrid in June this past summer, signed a Joint Declaration of Security Cooperation with Australia in October, signed a reciprocal access agreement with the United Kingdom in December, and is cooperating with the United Kingdom and Italy to develop a next-generation fighter jet. Japan even announced in August that it would begin research on hypersonic missiles, shortly after AUKUS stated it would focus on developing such missiles. Japan is the next logical country to join AUKUS.

Debate over two other Indo-Pacific powers joining AUKUS has been held. South Korea seems to be another obvious contender. Also a major U.S. ally, South Korea is another like-minded, liberal democracy in the region with concerns over China’s growing aggression. South Korea, upon AUKUS’ initial announcement, noted the pact would likely contribute “to regional stability” and supported Australia’s decision to acquire submarines. Seoul has long sought to develop nuclear-powered submarines, but has been limited in the development of that technology due to a nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States. While South Korea’s inclusion may be a bit trickier, it is still worth considering.

Then, there is India. India, an increasingly important player in the Indo-Pacific region, never officially embraced or condemned the AUKUS deal. The country, however, has approached AUKUS with some trepidation, maintaining its distance while working to delink the Quad from the trilateral security pact. AUKUS’s tacit focus on China would play into India’s favor; however, India’s reluctance to engage in or even entertain alliances means that India will likely not be looking to join AUKUS any time soon.

The United States Needs a Democratic India as a Partner

On April 11, U.S. President Joe Biden and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi held a virtual summit that kicked off the 2+2 Dialogue, during which Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin hosted their Indian counterparts. Started in 2018 as part of an effort to deepen ties between the U.S. and India, it is a tradition the Biden administration continued. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was front and center in the talks, as the United States and India have diverging views on the magnanimity of the event. India has held out on condemning Russia over the invasion, including India’s abstention from the U.N. Security Council resolution demanding that Russia cease its invasion in Ukraine.

Moscow’s Hold Over New Delhi

Why is New Delhi refusing to directly criticize Moscow? For one, India is trying to maintain its neutrality between the two nuclear powers, both of which are perceived as allies, as the United States rallies its global network of democratic allies to further punish Russia. India also continues to buy energy supplies from Russia, despite pleas from the United States to halt the activity. In March, India’s state-run oil corporation bought 3 million barrels of crude oil from Russia and Indian media recently reported that Moscow was offering discounts up to 20 percent below global prices as an enticement. Interestingly, India imports approximately only 1 percent of its oil from Russia, further confounding the Biden administration on India’s insistence on buying oil from Russia to the detriment of its relationship with the United States.

India’s relationship with Russia is more defined more by defense than its energy ties. The two countries have deep and longstanding defense ties. Today, Russia provides an estimated 85 percent of India’s equipment, though reports differ on the exact figure. India also recently purchased a Russian missile defense system, much to the United States’ chagrin as the U.S. has debated imposing sanctions on its South Asian ally as a result. Rooted in its Cold War-era tradition of non-alignment, India continues this policy of non-alignment, refusing to choose between the United States and Russia.

A Muted Response

Yet, despite divergent views, the Biden administration has had a somewhat muted response to its partner’s reluctance to take sides. In spite of India’s unwillingness to directly criticize Russia for its invasion of Ukraine, irony abounds as the United States will not directly or publicly criticize India. In his meeting with Prime Minister Modi, Mr. Biden refrained from publicly pushing the issue of India’s purchase of Russian oil and gas. However, White House officials later noted that Mr. Biden privately requested that India not “accelerate the purchase of Russian oil.”

While Mr. Biden, at times, has expressed mild discontent, calling India’s stance on the war “somewhat unsettled,” he mostly lauded India for the shared democratic values that supposedly bind the two countries and emphasized the growing defense cooperation. In his inability, or perhaps unwillingness, to call India out, Mr. Biden highlights the reason he sees the U.S. alliance with India so compelling. He, like several administrations before, sees India “as an ally to challenge China’s dominance in the Asia-Pacific region.” In other words, Mr. Biden needs India to play a key role in fulfilling one of his foreign policy objectives.

Democratic Backsliding Prevails

While the Biden administration builds up its alliance with India as a means of countering China, there is another troubled area of the relationship that the administration seems willing to overlook: the democratic backsliding India has seen over the past decade since Mr. Modi took office. Since 2014, some U.S. officials and foreign policy observers note concern over the state of India’s democracy and limited human rights protection. Recently, Freedom House, a non-partisan think tank which grades each country’s political rights and civil liberties through its infamous Freedom in the World Report, demoted India’s status from “free” to “partly free.” Similarly, a Swedish research institute now labels India as an “electoral autocracy.”

Mr. Modi’s victory in 2014 brought to power the Bharatiya Janata Party, a largely Hindu nationalist political movement. Mr. Modi’s human rights record is inconsistent and wanting at best as India has seen a rise in Hindu nationalism across the country, including reports of harassment of political opponents, activists, Muslims, and judges. The Biden administration, despite its promises to restore democracy and the rule of law back to the center of foreign policy, is failing to realize that by not pressing India to uphold these supposedly shared values, the relationship with India that the Biden administration holds in such high esteem is actually eroding the Biden administration’s commitment to democracy and human rights.

What about the Quad?

Despite the country’s democratic backsliding and U.S. concerns regarding human rights, the South Asian country remains critical to U.S. efforts toward countering China. India is a member of the Quad – a group of four democracies in the Indo-Pacific region that maintain close ties to the United States and have expressed concern over China’s growing assertiveness. The Biden administration utilizes the Quad as a forum for addressing China’s increasingly militaristic ambitions in the region, but the leaders of the Quad countries also spoke recently about the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

The Biden administration is using the Quad as a cover to avoid discussing in earnest U.S. concerns over the state of democracy and human rights within India as India’s unwillingness to call out Russia for its egregious acts in Ukraine will likely hinder India’s ties with its Quad allies. By papering over such concerns through India’s inclusion in what many would call a form of an alliance, the United States is, in turn, legitimizing the Modi regime and further highlighting the administration’s reticence in confronting its partner for fear the U.S. will lose its cooperation on both China and Russia, the two current central focuses in U.S. foreign policy.

The United States Needs a Strong and Democratic India

The United States has long held close relations with India. While not a defense treaty ally, the Biden administration sees India as key to its objective of countering China. India is also factoring into the United States and its allies’ fight against Russia after its invasion of Ukraine, with the United States doing what it can to persuade India to join other democracies around the world in punishing Russia. However, by not confronting India on its democratic backsliding and limited human rights, the United States is actually hindering its ability to restore democracy to the center of its foreign policy as well as in its fight against both China and Russia. The United States needs a strong, democratic India that protects the human rights of all its citizens as its partner to take on the new challenges the world faces.  

And Then There Were Four

On September 24, after the United Nations General Assembly in New York, U.S. President Joe Biden will host his Japanese, Australian, and Indian counterparts at the White House for the first in-person meeting of the Quad. The Quad, officially known as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, is a forum for multilateral cooperation among four countries in the Indo-Pacific region on a myriad of issues ranging from security to trade and everything in between. Above all, the Quad is an unofficial partnership between the member countries that share certain values and objectives, and with a mission to address mutual regional security concerns.

Since taking office in January, the Biden administration’s rhetoric and, at times, actions reflect a central foreign policy canon: repairing relationships with U.S. allies and partners. Moreover, President Biden came in to office with the goal of redirecting U.S. foreign policy by curtailing the United States’ focus on global terrorism and expanding to more prescient concerns, particularly China. At a time when the United States is most focused on repairing its ties with U.S. allies and partners and countering the rise of China, the Quad plays right into the Biden administration’s foreign policy agenda. 

Get By With a Little Help from Your Friends

The Quad fits neatly into the Biden administration’s foreign policy agenda as it epitomizes one of the fundamental principles: recalibrating ties with allies and partners. While the Quad is not a formal alliance like the ones the United States maintains with several Asian countries as well as its European allies through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Quad is made up of some of the United States’ closest friends. The United States has defense pacts with both Australia and Japan, dating back to the years right after World War II. The defense pacts have served as cornerstones in U.S. foreign policy for decades and, as a result, cooperation between the United States and both countries is natural and in U.S. interests. As a result of its participation the Quad, the U.S. is elevating the importance of these two key allies at a time where the U.S. president is pressing for repaired relationships with its key allies and partners.

Then, there is India, the only country in the Quad with which the United States does not a defense alliance. The Quad is not designed to be a formal military alliance. That fact, however, does not render India’s involvement any less critical; it actually makes India’s participation that much more important. India, which has historically resisted joining such alliances, is considered one of the United States’ most strategic partners. Through the multilateral cooperation of the Quad and bilaterally, the Biden administration views strengthening ties with India as crucial to his foreign policy agenda. The United States and India share many interests and global concerns, including China and climate change – two issues that form the basis of their collaboration. Through improved bilateral relations and a multilateral forum such as the Quad, the United States is strengthening its ties with India while also fulfilling one of the Biden administration’s fundamental foreign policy principles.

Let’s Be Honest

While no member of the Quad will directly confirm the purpose of the cooperation between the four countries exists to counter China’s economic and military aims, the world tactility understands its purpose. As the Economist observed in a recent article, the Quad is, at last, finding its purpose and that purpose “has everything to do with China.” The Quad was formed in the aftermath a deadly tsunami in the Indian Ocean in 2004 when the four countries worked together. At the time, Japan saw potential future cooperation as a way to address shared regional security challenges. At that time, however, the other countries were apprehensive about joining forces primarily due to concerns about China’s reaction. For the time being, the Quad remained only an idea.

Then, more than a decade later, the Quad came back together. By this time, the strategic calculus on China had changed immensely for the Quad members. For one, India, once the most reluctant member, is eager to balance China’s rising power, the most recent example being a border skirmish between Chinese and Indian forces in June 2020. Similarly, Japan is increasingly infuriated about China’s claims to islands in the East China Sea and China’s abysmal human rights record. China sparked a trade war with Australia and recently scolded Australia. Lastly, the United States now sees its relationship with China as “the biggest geopolitical test” that the world faces and has redirected U.S. foreign policy to meet that. At a time when all four countries are fed up with China’s antics in the region, the Quad proves to be an excellent method for accomplishing one of the Biden administration’s foreign policy objectives: countering China.  

Conclusion

As the leaders of the Quad member countries meet at the White House, the Biden administration is looking to expand the group’s agenda. The Biden administration’s foreign policy has two core objectives: its call for repairing relationships with U.S. allies and partners and its objective of countering China. As a result, the Quad plays right into the Biden administration’s foreign policy agenda.   

Assuaging U.S. Allies in Asia

*This post is final in a series exploring what America’s allies in Asia can expect from the Biden administration and the regional concern about China’s recent assertive behavior.*

U.S. Alliances in Asia

At the end of World War II, the United States established a system of bilateral, treaty-based alliances[1] in the Asia-Pacific region designed to “contain communism in the region.” These alliances involve a “shared commitment to respond collectively to armed attacks.” In short, these allies are ones that the United States is willing (and obligated by the treaty) to defend if that ally is attacked.

Beyond those formal defense alliances, the United States also formed and maintained close and strategic partnerships with several other countries in Asia, most importantly, India. Through the Cold War and into the post-Cold War world, the United States has maintained these strategic alliances and partnerships to ensure stability in the Asia-Pacific region and to meet regional and global challenges head on. 

The Trump Years

U.S. relations with its key partners were largely bumpy during the Trump administration. Former President Trump castigated Japan and South Korea, demanding that the two allies pay more because the United States posts U.S. troops in those countries as part of the security alliances. This, in turn, caused these key allies to worry that  whether America’s commitment to them is conditional. Conversely, some in Asia appreciated Trump’s tougher stance on China and the fact that he tried to engage with Kim Jong Un on North Korea’s nuclear program, with little to no results.

Trump further damaged U.S. ties to the region by removing the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership free trade deal and further scorning the “open, multilateral trading regimes that have buoyed Asia’s economic success.” As the Economist observes, “Never has America’s ability to underpin Asia’s stability and prosperity been so doubted by the region’s leadership and policymakers as over the past four years.”

The Biden Administration

President Joe Biden began his new administration by contacting the leaders of the United States’ key allies and partners in Asia, specifically Japan, South Korea, Australia, and India. He reiterated his commitment to the bilateral relationships. Consequently, these countries have all signaled eagerness to work with the Biden administration and want to work with the United States to counter what they view as the most pressing issues in their region: the rise of China and its increasingly assertive behavior throughout the region. 

China’s Aggressive Behavior in the Asia-Pacific Region

China’s political, economic, and military assertiveness in the Asia-Pacific region has increased in recent years. From sending ships to put pressure around the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea to its crackdown in Hong Kong or its territorial disputes in the South China Sea to its recent incursion of war planes over Taiwan to its genocidal repression of the Uighurs in the Xinjiang province, China’s behavior is, one could argue, aggressive.

Most of the United States’ allies and partners have expressed concern over this growing assertiveness. As a result, the Biden administration has “stressed the importance of allies in responding to the strategic competition posed by Beijing.” Scott Campbell, a member of the Center of Strategic Studies aptly described Biden’s approach: “China policy in 2021 I think is actually going to be about ally policy.” This is evidenced by the commitments and reassurances that Biden made when reaching out to its key allies and partners in Asia.

Japan

Japan views China as a threat to its security. In fact, Japan is “actively promoting military and economic partnerships with countries in the Indo-Pacific region to counter China’s rise.” During his conversation with Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga, Biden confirmed his commitment to “provide extended deterrence to Japan,” including affirming that the U.S.-Japan security treaty includes the Senkaku Islands, which both Japan and China claim.  

South Korea

South Korea’s relationship with China has been largely civil and even prosperous. What concerns South Korea is China’s continued relations with North Korea. China is essentially North Korea’s lifeline in a world where it has been very isolated, serving as North Korea’s most important trading and diplomatic partner. This causes grave concern to South Korea due to the North’s unchecked nuclear program and a desire to reunite the Korean peninsula. Recognizing this vulnerability, Biden spoke of bolstering the U.S.-South Korea alliance, which is “the linchpin for peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia.” 

Australia

Australia has also voiced concerns about China’s regional behavior and has participated in a few diplomatic spats with Beijing. In his recent phone call with the Australian prime minister, Biden, much like with South Korea and Japan, reiterated the importance of the alliance and discussed how the two allies can tackle the global challenges that face them, including the rise of China. After speaking with Biden, Morrison tweeted, “There are no greater friends and no greater allies than Australia and the U.S.”

India

India is also enthusiastic and hopeful about the prospect of U.S.-Indian relations during the Biden administration, particularly in the face of China’s recent aggression. “China is the big elephant in the room,” noted an Indian writer and analyst. Long-existing tensions between India and China came to a head last summer when the armies from each side lined up along the disputed border in the Himalaya Mountains. Biden spoke with his Indian counterpart, promising to build upon the relationship and collaborate on global challenges.

The “Quad”

One multilateral forum with which the United States and its allies has countered a rising China is through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, also known as the Quad, comprised of the United States, Japan, Australia, and India. Originally formed in 2004 to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief after a tsunami devastated countries in the Indian Ocean, Australia pulled out in 2007. The Quad was rehabilitated in 2017, expanding into military and economic areas as a result of the rise of China. The Biden administration has signaled to its allies will not be soft on China and will likely continue to use the Quad as a means of countering China in the Asia-Pacific region.

Conclusion

China’s rising assertiveness in Asia is a recognized challenge by the United States and its allies and partners in the region. Countering China’s assertiveness remain be at the center of the Biden administration’s approach and includes reassuring U.S. allies and partners that the United States will cooperate and consult with them on what has been mutually agreed upon as the most pressing issue in the region: China’s increasingly assertive behavior.

[1] In the aftermath of World War II, the United States signed defense treaties with the following countries: The Treaty of Peace with Japan was signed on September 8, 1951; Security Treaty Between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States (ANZUS) on September 1, 1951; Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Philippines on August 30, 2951; Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea on October 1, 1953; and the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (Thailand) on September 8, 1954. Currently, the United States has five treaty alliances with countries in the Asia-Pacific: Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand. The New Zealand leg of the ANZUS alliance was suspended in the mid-1989s as a result of New Zealand’s nuclear policies. Today, the United States and New Zealand remain close friends but no longer formal allies. The United States and Taiwan were once allied under the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of China, signed December 2, 1954. That treaty was terminated by the United States in1979 as a result of the U.S. decision to switch official recognition of the People’s Republic of China. The Taiwan Relations Act now guides U.S, -Taiwan relations and was enacted on April 10, 1979 to ensure that the United States would continue to help Taiwan defend itself against an attack by the People’s Republic of China.